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11 January 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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1. Laos: Phoumi says he will go to Geneva with Boun Oum, but intends to take hard line in negotiations. (*Page i*)

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


3. Belgium-Congo: Union Miniere, under urging from Spaak, sends emissary to try to reach understanding with Adoula government. (*Page ii*)

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Laos: [General Phoumi now says he will accompany Boun Oum to Geneva and that he is ready to leave as soon as the co-chairmen set a date for new talks there with Souvanna Phouma and Souphannouvong. Both of the latter are likely to agree to such talks; Souvanna is now in Paris and Souphanouvong is in Xieng Khouang. Unless Phoumi modifies his attitude, however, the projected meeting will only serve to harden the lines between Vientiane and the other sides. Phoumi told Ambassador Brown on 10 January that Boun Oum plans to tell Souvanna that Vientiane no longer considers him premier-designate in view of his inability to form a cabinet. Phoumi also said that he intends to call an early National Congress to grant King Savang full powers to appoint a government unilaterally. Phoumi still hopes to talk the King into personally heading a new government, and wants to have a letter from Savang summoning the three princes to Luang Prabang after an impasse is reached at Geneva.]

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
[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board on 10 January reached the following conclusion concerning Laos:]

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[Although restraints imposed by the major powers may serve as a brake during the renewed search for a political solution, localized military engagements will probably continue, and both sides in Laos are laying a propaganda basis which could serve to justify any renewal of major military operations.]

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Map Page

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Belgium-Congo: The principal Belgian mining concern in Katanga, the Union Miniere, acting on the suggestion of Foreign Minister Spaak, has sent a high official to Leopoldville in an effort to reach an understanding on economic matters with the Adoula government. The US Embassy in Brussels reports that the Belgian parliament, however, is in a "dangerous mood" on Congo questions and is not supporting Spaak's efforts to put pressure on Belgian economic interests to reach an accord with the Congo Government. Even Spaak's own Socialist party, despite its consistent opposition to Katanga secession, is reluctant to support him on this issue because of the state of Belgian public opinion over reports of UN brutality in the Congo. Spaak is having trouble holding off a group of powerful right-wing senators who are demanding that the UN reimburse Belgian citizens for damages inflicted by UN forces in Katanga.

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
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### WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

 On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:


(No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.)

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Berlin: Communist military activity, as in recent weeks, does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk serious military confrontation over Berlin in the immediate future. The East German regime is preparing further measures designed to establish the East-West German zonal border as an international frontier, which could result in further harassments of contacts between West Germany and West Berlin.]

South Vietnam: Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity continues at a high rate, despite counter-actions in various regions by government forces. The Viet Cong has the capability of conducting large-scale attacks on pre-selected targets in some areas of the country at any time.]

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#### CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 28 December 1961 through 9 January 1962:

1. On the basis of the developments listed below, we conclude that the Soviets have made no firm decisions on their next moves and desire sufficient time to explore the Western position thoroughly in present bilateral and possibly subsequent four-power talks:

a. Soviet year-end statements, greetings, and Khrushchev interviews stress negotiations and the peaceful coexistence line, with only routine treatment of a German treaty and avoidance of any deadline;

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b. East German propaganda and high-level pronouncements reflect a general uncertainty over the course of Soviet policy in coming months;

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e. The informal Soviet memorandum to Bonn's ambassador hints that some political ties between West Germany and Berlin could be continued under a new agreement on Berlin's status;

f. The evident Soviet interest in continuing the talks with Ambassador Thompson implies that no major moves will be taken until further diplomatic probing has taken place.

2. In a further effort to give the East - West German zonal border the status of a state frontier, the East Germans are taking initial steps toward instituting formal customs controls on freight transiting East Germany. West Berlin freight has not yet been affected

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3. The press treatment accorded locally to General Watson's turnabout at Friedrichstrasse on 23 December, the Watson-Solovyev exchange of letters, the Ulbricht-Schorr interview broadcast of 4 January, and the Neues Deutschland editorial of 3 January suggest that the East German regime has plans for new moves to assert its "sovereignty" at the sector border. In

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this regard the imposition of frontier controls at the sector  
border and even "legal" incorporation of East Berlin into  
the territory of the GDR could be effected at any time. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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